- Term 1:
-
See: Term 2.
- Term 2:
-
Definition for term 2.
- Internet-scale digital trust
-
The mission of the Trust over IP (ToIP) Foundation is to define a complete architecture for Internet-scale digital trust that combines cryptographic assurance at the machine layer with human accountability at the business, legal, and social layers. https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-keri-specification#foreword
- Repair the internet
-
The original design of the Internet Protocol (IP) has no security layer(s), providing no built-in mechanism for secure attribution to the source of an IP packet. Anyone can forge an IP packet, and a recipient may not be able to ascertain when or if the packet was sent by an imposter. This means that secure attribution mechanisms for the Internet must be overlaid. https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-keri-specification#introduction
- trust spanning layer
-
The KERI white paper presents an identifier system security overlay, called the Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) protocol, that serves as a trust spanning layer for the Internet. https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-keri-specification#introduction
- Simplification
-
One trust spanning layer for the Internet, when Trust spanning layer is widely accepted and when this is done : Repair the internet.
-
A design principle (derived from Repair the internet): The KERI protocol provides verifiable authorship (authenticity) of any message or data item via secure cryptographically verifiable attribution to a SCID as a primary root-of-trust.
https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-keri-specification#introduction - SCID as a primary root-of-trust
-
This root-of-trust is cryptographic, not administrative, because it does not rely on any trusted third-party administrative process but may be established with cryptographically verifiable data structures.
https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-keri-specification#introduction - No reliance on not controlled infrastructure
-
This cryptographic root-of-trust (SCID primary rot) enables end verifiability where every data item may be cryptographically attributable to its source by any recipient verifier, without reliance on any infrastructure not under the verifier’s ultimate control.
https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-keri-specification#introduction Intervening operational infra replaceable -
Derived feature Verfiable authorship: Because of (No reliance on not controlled infrastructure), KERI has no security dependency on any other infrastructure and does not rely on security guarantees that may or may not be provided by the traditional internet infrastructure. This makes intervening operational infrastructure replaceable, enabling ambient verifiability (verification by anyone, anywhere, at any time).
https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-keri-specification#introduction